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UNCERTAINTY AND THE THEORY OF TAX INCIDENCE IN A STOCK MARKET ECONOMY
David P. Baron and Robert Forsythe 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Commencing with Harberger's (1962) classic paper, a number of 
studies1 have analyzed the incidence of taxation in the context of 
a deterministic, two-sector, two-factor general equilibrium model. 
Recently, R. N. Batra (1975) and R. A. Ratti and P. Shame (1977a, 1977b) 
have reexamined the robustness of these deterministic results for the 
case in which production uncertainty is incorporated into the model. 
By using "entrepreneurial" models in which the firm is assumed to 
maximize the expected utility of profits, they find that the 
incidence of taxes depends on the preferences and probability assessments 
of the entrepreneur, and in general, the deterministic results no 
longer obtain. 
Most firms, however, are not owned by a single individual, 
and Batra and Ratti and Shame do not indicate how appropriate their 
results are for other ownership forms. In particular, their models 
do not utilize any form of risk-sharing arrangements such as those 
available through the securities markets. In the presence of 
a stock market, it will be shown that the standard deterministic 
results continue to hold for the firm in their economy if the firm 
has publicly-traded securities and acts in the best interests of its 
shareholders. With this shareholders' interests criterion and the 
Batra-Ratti-Shame model, the securities market is suffidient to 
•eparete the prod�tioo deei•ion• of the fi� from the �rtfolio 
consumption decisions of shareholders. 2 In a related analysis, , I Baron and Forsythe (1979) focus on the role of the s�cu,it1es 
market in establishing unanimity among shareholders about tlhe vall!itle 
maximization criterion for firms. Here, the emphasis islorl the 
of se:ll1'fration, 
ts hJ�l lthe 
••� q�litative p�pret1"• •• in a determioi•tic �del, l a d th� 
standard propositions regarding the incidence of taxation c ntiJ _ 
to hold. For expositional purposes only, the analysis wl11 be JI 1 1 .ted 
impact of taxes on production and factor rewards. Because 
the equilibrium in the securities, output, and factoi- ma k 
to the study of the effect of the corporate income tax, Jut in jl II final 
section the results for other forms of taxation, such as Ith se J ll;;idered . 
toch I, He by Mieszkowski (1967) , will be shown to also extend to tHe 
economy considered here. 
2. THE MODEL AND EQUILIBRIUM 
A. Firms 
Following the model specified by Harberger, a twb-1actor 
model is considered in which � is produced in the corporlt sec� 
and X2 is the noncorporate sector. Production takes placl under 
conditions of perfect competition, full employment, irielalt 
. I 
c fac 
II
The quantitl!es 
capital and labor employed in the jth sector are denoted by IKj 
and L., respectively, and Kand Lare the total fixed supbl�es 
J 
supplies, and irreversible factor intensities. 01 
a.Iii 
each factor. 
r 
3 
The output of the corporate sector is subject to uncertainty 
with a production function of the form 
� = aF1(IS_,L1),
where a is a random variable, a.::_ O, representing exogenous and
uncertain influences affecting output. The output of the noncorporate 
sector is assumed to be deterministic and given by 
Xz = F2(K2,L2) .
Although each sector is assumed to be composed of many firms, only 
a representative firm in each sector will be analyzed in order to 
simplify the notation. The production functions Fj,j = 1,2, are 
assumed to be linear homogeneous and concave so that 
Fj(Kj,Lj) L/j(kj) ,  j 1,2,
where kj is the capital-labor ratio in sector 
j, fj > 0, and 
fj < o. 
It is assumed that firms make their input decisions at the 
beginning of the period, prior to the realization a, by contracting
for labor at the competitive wage rate w and financing their capital 
purchases by selling bonds, Bj = Kj, j 
1, 2, which yield a
deterministic gross rate of return rj (rj .::_ 1) determined in a securities
4 
market. At the completion of trades in the securities a�d fiacror 
markets, the contracted levels of inputs are employed an1 a lis real���d, 
' 
as is output. The market clearing price in the corporat� sect4>r outlllht 
market depends on a and hence is uncertain at the time iJpuJ decis· 
are made.  
Ratti and Shame (1977a) recognize that the pri�e is 
! I L. ' uncertain but, in order to avoid dealing with price uncertaint�, tHi I assume a small country for which product prices are give� bx wbrld 
I 
I 
markets. Batra does not make the small country assumption, 1ye 
assumes that the output price is not random. In noting 4hisi, 
and Shome (1977b) suggest that when assuming a large cou;t�,
which equates expected demand to expected supply should be use 
. I will be demonstrated, these assumptions are unnecessary, since 
: I an uncertain price does not affect the standard tax incidence 
results for the model considered here. 3
tti 
p,I 
When the output market clears, factors are paid tHei 
wages, and the after-tax earnings are then distributed toi shlrelholde 
in proportion to their holdings. Finally, it is assumed [ I 
that all commitments to factor inputs are met and that there ia no 
4 : I risk of default on the bond obligations. Letting p(a) lenltel the 
price of output in the first sector expressed in terms of tne hrice 
  in the second sector, the after-tax earnings rr1 (a) of th+ co,rp4>rate 
sector may be expressed as 
1 
n1(a) (1 - t) (p(a) aF1(K1,L1) - r1B1 - wL{) 
(1 - t) [p(a) aL1f1(k1) - L1Cr1k1 + �)], 
e 
5 
where t is the corporate income tax rate. The tax system is assumed 
to be such that the corporate tax involves full loss offset. The 
earnings of the noncorporate sector are given by 
(1) Il2 = F2(K2,t2) - r2B2 - wL2 = t2f2(k2) - L2(r2k2 + w). 
Adopting the view of Harberger (p. 215) that the corporation 
income tax is one "which strikes the earnings of capital in the 
corporate sector, but not in the noncorporate sector," the return on 
the debt as well as the equity of a firm in the first sector is subject 
to the tax. In this case, the appropriate equilibrium condition 
in the bond market is 
(1 - t)r1 = r2 = r.
Thus, the after-tax return to the equity of the corporate sector 
can be rewritten as 
(2) Ill (CL) (1 - t)[p(a)a.L1f1(k1) - wL1] - rk1L1.�
It should be clear from this formulation that the Harberger assumption 
requires that interest payments are not deductible as usually is assumed 
in the finance literature. If interest were deductible, the after-tax 
return to equity in sector one would be 
(3) n1(a) = (1 - t)[p(a)a.L1f1 (k1) - wL1 - r�L1],
since equilibrium in the bond market would require 
rl = r2 - r. 
6 
To parallel the Harberger analysis, the specification giien lbYI (2) 
i 
is used throughout the remainder of the paper. In the concl!usji.on, iliP�ever, 
it will be shown that if interest payments are deductibll tJenlthe 
imposition of a corporate income tax is neutral, since i� hJs no efifi�ct 
on the equilibrium in this model, and for realizations of a lfo 
i 
which profits are positive (negative), the corporate inc�me ltak is 
I 
exactly a lump-sum tax (subsidy). 
B. Consumers 
r 
At the beginning of the period, consumers are asstimetl to 
portfolio decisions and to allocate their labor and capilal ltol fi
while at the end of the period they purchase commoditiesjusin 
I 
factor payments plus their share of the profits distribu�ed lb� fi
I 
At the end of the period consumer i's consumption proble�, 
on a, is 
(4) maximize 
i i 
c1,c2 
subject to 
i i i U (C1, c2) 
0 i i i 0 p(a )c1 + c2 2 I (a ),
i i i where U (c1,c2) is an ordinal, concave utility function
commodities and Ii(aO) is the income of consumer i when
realization of a.5
two 
he 
e 
7 
Consumer i is assumed to be initially endowed with fixed 
-i -i amounts of labor L and capital K which may be hired by firms at 
prices w and r, respectively. Each consumer i is also endowed with 
-i a portfolio consisting of ownership shares, y1, of the corporate
sector firms. A consumer may sell his shares in the securities 
i market at the market price v1 and may purchase new shares y1 or
i bonds b • Since the noncorporate sector does not include publicly-
traded firms, it is assumed that consumers receive a fixed share, 
-i 6 7 y2, of their profits. ' Thus, income available for consumption is 
given by 
I\a) L -i i -i Yill1(a) + y2rr2 + rb + wL • 
Each consumer is assumed to have a subjective probability 
assessment of a which may be represented by the absolutely continuous, 
i distribution function G (a). At the beginning of the period each 
consumer solves the portfolio problem 
(5) 
maximize 
i i y1,y2,b 
subject to 
Eiui(Ii(a) ,p(a))
i i -L -i 
YJ:V l + b � YJ:V l + K , 
i i where u (I (a), p(a)) obtained from (3) is consumer i's indirect utility 
i i 
function which is assumed to be strictly concave in I (a), and E 
denotes the expectation operator. 8 
C. SECURITY AND FACTOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
I 
It is assumed that firms act in the best interestl o 
8 
shareholders and in this model it can be shown that shJrehblders 
unanimously prefer that the firm maximizes its market vdluel. ISinc 
uncertainty enters linearly into the returns of firms irl t�e 
corporate sector, it is easy to show that the random coJpoJen 
the return, p(a)a, can be obtained by a linear combinatlon bf 
securities, i. e. , 
p(a)a s1 rr1 (a) + s2 rr2
where 
81 
1 
(l-t)L1 fl(�) 
and s2
r 
L1[(1-t)w + rk11
(l-t)L1 fl (�)IT2 I 
* i Given this spanning property, the "price, II E:, of the ra ndolm r 
component p(a)a of the return is the market certainty etui,al 
the random variable p(a)a discounted to the beginning of ttie 
Duo <o <h• mul<iplira<iv• na<ur• of �•r<ain<y, <h• �1ke1 r
equivalent may be determined directly from the market vtlue o
i 9 corporate sector firm, the inputs, and the factor prices. 
of 
exist 
nt °' 
orio� 
rtai
the 
By assuming that the input decisions of one firm lhave a 
 effect on the availability of inputs of other firms and 
 I consumers perceive that the profit and market yalue bf a 
neglible 
that all 
firm is independent of the decisions of any other firm, ;it lmav be 
I . shown that all shareholders prefer that firms in the coTporat 
g 
en 
9 
10 maximize their market value given by 
(6) 
1 
V1= r {(l - t)p*L1f1(k1) - L1[(1 - t)w + r�]}.
The preferred input levels for firms maximize the values 
11 
v1 and n2 and satisfy 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
and 
(10} 
(1 - t)p*fi(�) - r = 0
(1 - t)(p*f (k_) - w) - rk = 0 1 --i 1 
f' (k ) - r = 0 2 2 
f2(k2) - w - rk2 = o. 
An equilibrium in factor markets requires that the returns to factors 
be the same in both sectors, so 
(11) p*(l - t)fi(kl) f2(k2)
and 
(12) p*(f1<k1> - �fi<k1>> = fzCkz> - kzfi<k2>·
At an equilibrium resources are fully employed, so 
(13) 
(14) 
\' -i K = l K = L1k1 + L2k2 
i 
- \' -i L = L L =L + L  
i 1 
2 
I 
It is assumed that an equilibrium exists and that positlvela '1 unts
of both commodities are produced. 
Some additional work is required to derive thk t 
market clearing condition in this model.  To accomplish i this, ! it
is useful to think of a firm as producing a bundle of 11lutlut'-11 
! I defined across states of the world. In this model there are 
I I 
0 0 such outputs: the first provides the consumer with p(al )a l uhits 
income if the realization of a is a0, the second provid�s onel uniti 
I I of income independent of the realization of a. Substithting r6) 
, I into the budget constraint of the consumer's problem in  (5). a d
rearranging terms, it can be seen that 
� [(l - t)yfr,1f1(�)] + � {-yi11[(1 - t)w + rk1J rbTl 
' 
• "f- [(l - tlYii,,£1<",>I + � l-Yi[<1 -+ t rf'il < 
-i -i_ Thus, consumer i is endowed with z1 = (1 - t)ylL1f1(k1)iof lou�put  
-i -i -i I and z1 = {-yi11[(1 - t)w + rk1J + rK } units of output Two lanU th 
i i_ consumer purchases z1 = (1 - t)ylLlfl(k1) of output one rand 
i i_ i i  z2 = {-yi11[(1 -t)w + rk1J + rb } units of output two. iTh�s,lthe 
reformulated budget constraint becomes 
(15) - p*z + z � - p*z + z 
1 � i i] 1 � -i -iJ r 1 2 r 1 2 
.i}.
(17) 
dk 
dw = -k f" _
2 .
dt 2 2 dt 
13 
These conditions imply that the real rewards to capital and labor 
vary inversely with the corporate tax rate, since the inputs are 
substitutes. To determine the derivatives of the right sides of 
(16) and (17), substitute 12 = L - 11 from (14) and totally
differentiate the equilibrium system of equations (13), (11), (12), 
and (16) with respect to the corporation income tax rate to obtain 
kl-k2
(18) I 0 
0 
p*f 1 
Ll
* " (1-t)p fl 
* II -p klfl
* f' p 11 1
L2 0 dL1 I 
-f" 2 (1-t)f� .dkl
k f" 2 2 f1-k1fi dk2 
0 OLlfl dp
* I 
= 
where d11 • -d12, the derivative of (18) has been multiplied by p*,
and o is the price elasticity of demand given by 
o = -dD(p*) dp* 
±__ = -D'p* D(p*) L1 fl • 
The determinant C of the coefficient matrix is 
I 0 
* I p fldt
0 
I 0 
14 
+ w) + p*(l - t)J2f11 (�l +
I} 
c p* {(f1)2 [ 1 f" (k + w)(k (1 - t)1 1 2 2 2 
where 
- OLlflflfZ(kl - k2) (kl - (
1 - 1)k2r 
w = w /r = (f - k f')/f'i i i i I 
is the wage-rental ratio. In the Harberger model, the ststem [S 
Alternativ11y.I i
it is necessary to assume that k1 > (1 
- t)k2• This will clrt 
be satisfied if the corporate sector is capital intensiv� rJla 
evaluated at t = 0 which assures that C < O.
I I to the noncorporate sector. The solution to dk2/dt is g�ven b I I 
I 
t 1111f 
inlYi 
ive 
dk,/dt = !; {(p'fil'L1 [ "i'l o(w + "i)(kl - k2) - •<i(i +i•2f J }, 
 
and since C < O, if the corporate sector is more capital ) intlensive 
than the noncorporate sector, dk2/dt > 0. 
i 
With this resUlt lit 
can now be seen from (16) and (17) that a corporate incoke 
tax increases the wage paid to labor and decreases the rlturn
to capital, i. e. , I 
(19) dr/dt < 0 and dw/dt > 0. 
11 
Given this interpretation, Harberger's assumption will be 
employed; namely, that the government spends the proceeds of the tax to 
exactly counterbalance the reduction on private expenditures in the 
two outputs at the initial price p* and that redistributions of income 
among consumers leave the pattern of demand unchanged. That is, 
consumers purchase (1 - t)L1f1Ck1) units of the first output and the
government receives �L1f1Ck1) units of that output. The government
redistributes its receipts to the consumers so that the total amount 
available in the market is L1f1 (k1) .  When the tax revenue is spent
in the same manner as consumers would at the existing prices, there 
12 is no direct tax effect and only relative commodity prices affect 
aggregate demand. Using each consumer's reformulated budget constraint 
in (15) it is seen that with full employment, the demand for product 
one determines the demand for product two. At the equilibrium certainty 
equivalent price p* the quantity demanded D (p*) of claims to output 
one is 
D (p*) i * - I: z1(p ) .i 
� -i 
The supply of output one is l z1
i 
(16) D (p*) - t1f1 (k1) 
L1f1 (�) ,  so in equilibrium
o. 
With this market clearing condition, the equilibrium of this model 
may now be analyzed.by examining the system of five equations (11) -
(14) and (16), in five unknowns, � · k2, L1, L2, and P*·
3. UNCERTAINTY AND TAX INCIDENCE 
Batra and Ratti and Shome find that when firms m1xinliz 
expected utility of profits, the results of Harberger and MiJsz 
 I fail to obtain. For example, Batra concludes that Harberger's I 
result turns on the behavior of firm's relative and absolute 
since the factor returns in his model are dependent uponithe 
functions and probability assessments of firms. With a beclrI I market, however, the factor returns depend only on the certai I I equivalent market price and, as will be shown in this seption, 
 results derived by Harberger remain unaffected. Due to thelf  that the reduced form of the model is isomorphic to the certa  I economy, this result is hardly surprising. In fact, the syst  
equations, (11) - (14) and (16) are identical to those consid 
by Harberger. I . To illustrate that such is that case in this slocla
·environment, it will be shown that if the corporate sector isI I intensive relative to the noncorporate sector, then, in propoI I to its share of national income, capital will bear a gre�ter 
i of the corporate income tax than labor. Since r = fz anf 
 w = (f2 - k2f2) from (9) and (10) , respectively, the effrctlo 
real reward to factors is given by 
and 
dk dr 
= f" __ 2 dt 2 dt 
12 
the 
OWJ 
priJ��lal 
sk irn
W
sion, 
ili
ies 
y-
the 
ty 
of 
red 
tic 
::::1 
urden: 
the 
Similarly , evaluating the effect of the tax on the certainty 
equivalent price gives 
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dp*/dt .. t { (p*fp2 [ k2L1 f2(w + k2) + p*k1L2fj'. (k1 + w) J }> o, 
if k1 > (1 - t) k2• Thus the corporate income tax unambiguously 
increases the relative commodity price. 
If 9L denotes the share of labor and 0K the share of
capital in national income (y = wL + rK + T) , then 
(20) eL = wL/(wL + rK + T)
and 
(21) eK = rK/(wL + rK + T) , 
where T is tax revenue.13 Differentiating (20) and (21) with respect
to the corporate income tax rate gives 
(22) 
and 
(23) 
- = - L (rK + T) - wL - K + - /y 
dElL [dw ( dr dT )] 2 
dt dt dt dt 
d0 [ ( )]K dr - - - dw - dT 2 - = - K (wL + T) - rK - L + - /y • dt dt dt dt 
In order to determine which factor bears the 
of the tax in proportion to its initial share, (22) and 
be used to obtain 
l dElL 
e dt" L 
l dElK l dw l dr 
eK dt" 
= ; dt - -r dt • 
I 16 
greaten burden! 
(23) mqy 
1) I t Using (19) , this quantity is seen to be positive if either 
I 
system is evaluated at t = 0 and the corporate sector is moke 
tapital inten<ive th� the •=torpors" aeteor, or 2) th• l •f<&H� 
capital-labor ratio in the corporate sector exceeds the capitjl-labor 
i I
ratio in the noncorporate sector. The Harberger result that capital : I 
bears a greater burden of the tax in proportion to its shate of natio I I 
income than does labor continues to hold under either of these two I 
assumptions.  
As indicated above, the deductibility of interest I 
payments will leave the decisions of firms unaffected by the tax : I 
structure. This result is immediate since with the deductibilit 
assumption r1 = r2 = r ,  and the right-hand-side of eq
uatiol sJstem 
(18) is identically zero. This is consistent with the eariieJ 
analyses of Stiglitz (1973) and King (1975) and, as Stiglihz Joihts  
out "from an efficiency point of view, the whole corporate l profilts 
 
tax structure is just like a lump-sum tax on corporations. ' 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
If the securities of a firm are traded and prodJctibn lis 
subject to multiplicative uncertainty, the securities markJtI 
17 
establishes a certainty equivalent price that firms can use in planning 
their inputs in a manner directly analogous to that in a deterministic 
model. The certainty equivalent price separates production decisions 
from a consumer's consumption-portfolio decisions, so it is hardly 
surprising that Harberger's tax incidence results continue to hold. 
Furthermore, the analysis of partial factor taxes also becomes 
straightforward in this model and, with the methodology developed 
here, Mieszkowski's results can be shown to extend to a stochastic 
world. 
Studies of firm behavior under uncertainty that represent 
the objectives of firms in terms of the preferences and expectations 
of a decision maker, either an entrepreneur or a manager, will 
necessarily conclude that those preferences and expectations influence 
production decisions \lllless a market is present that prices out the 
14 
uncertainty in the model. The tax incidence results of Batra and 
Ratti and Shome are thus applicable to firms owned and operated by 
a single entrepreneur but not to publicly-traded firms that are 
managed in the interests of their shareholders. An alternative 
justification for the expected utility maximization objective of a 
firm is that it is descriptive of managerial decision making when 
ownership is separated from the control of a firm. Even in the case 
of a manager who maximizes an arbitrary expected utility function, 
however, Baron and Forsythe have shown that separation obtains if 
the firm trades its own shares through treasury purchases. The 
conclusions of deterministic theory are then applicable. 
I 18 
To argue that uncertainty compromises the results lof 
deterministic theory in a model in which the uncertainty lntersl in 
linear manner thus requires rather special assumptions about Ith 
owner or manager of the firm. In a more general model, hhwever1, 
the necessary separation may not result. The correspondelce l beltWeert 
! 
the uncertainty model considered here and the deterministfc mod i I 
results because the return vector (across states) of a col.-porat! 
sector firm is spanned by the return vectors of the securities 
in the stock market. When the technology of the firm is buc�I I 
this spanning property is not satisfied, shareholders wil! no 
in general, be in agreement with respect to their preferences 
 
decisions of a firm, since there is no unambiguous objectivelf 
firm to pursue. In this case there is little guidance as tolh 
firm should make its decisions and hence no framework in �ich lthe 
incidence of taxes can be investigated. 
19 
FOOTNOTES 
1. These include Johnson (1956), Mieszkowski (1967) , and Wells (1955) . 
2. An analysis of the conditions needed for this separation may
be found in Baron (1979) . 
3. This result depends importantly on the form of the production
function since it is linear in a. 
4. The same results will obtain if there is default risk but no
bankruptcy costs as demonstrated in Baron (1976) . 
5. The reformulation given in this section is based on that given 
in Helpman and Razin (1978) and used in Baron and Forsythe (1979) . 
i The optimal consumption is a function of p(a) and I (a) and
hence indirectly a function of a. 
6. If the noncorporate sector is viewed as being composed of 
institutions such as mutual insurance companies or mutual savings 
associations, trading in ownership shares could be considered. 
Similarly, if farms are included in that sector, consumers could 
purchase or sell acreage or enter into sharecropping arrangements. 
7. This analysis allows for noncorporate firms which may be wholly 
owned by a single individual. If individual i' owns such a firm, 
-i' -i then Yz = 1 and y2 = O for i # i'.
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
I 
For a detailed derivation of this indirect utility abprqac,., 
see Milne (1979) . 
The price � is given by r 
� = SlVl + S2Il2/r
I 
20 
= [ r (V1 + k1L1) + (1 - t)wLi ] I (L1fl (k1!H 
 These conditions are derived by maximizing the consumer' 
- r� 
expe II utility at a securities market equilibrium. The d rijat 
�r bo pro•onrod ho�, •inc• �logou• condiri�•  '' �o±ivod .on W' 
in Baron and Forsythe (1979) . 
 I . As Milne (1976, 1979) has shown the reduction of the asset 
economy to one in which 
(i) consumers solve the portfolio problem in (5) 
(ii) corporate firms maximize their market valuh in (�) 
I I. (iii) noncorporate firms maximize their profits in ('1.)1, 
 is isomorphic to a certainty economy in which the lric� ts p*
12. I The tax does not directly affect any consumer s clailliS to un• 
of the first output. 
ed 
21 
13. Because of the constant returns to scale technology, the value 
of equity capital does not enter these expressions, since the 
equilibrium market value of each firm is zero. This can be seen 
by multiplying (7) by L1 and comparing the resulting expression
with that for v1• Similarly, multiplying (9) by L2 indicates the
profit of the noncorporate sector firm is zero. 
14. Such would be the case if uncertainty enters into the noncorporate 
sector and there are no risk-sharing markets in that sector. Since 
no certainty equivalent price can be established which the 
noncorporate firms may use in planning their decisions, the standard 
tax incidence results will depend upon the preferences and 
expectations of the managers of the noncorporate firms. 
I I !2 
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